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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
CPS Chemical Company, Inc. ("CPS") petitions for review 
of an order of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" 
or "Board") finding that CPS violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) 
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act") by 
refusing to recognize and bargain with Local 8-397 of the 
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union 
("OCAW" or "International"). The Board has cross-petitioned 
for enforcement of its bargaining order. CPS does not 
contest that it failed to recognize and bargain with Local 8- 
397. Rather, it argues that it was not obligated to do so 
because the affiliation of the independent union at CPS's 
Old Bridge, New Jersey, plant with Local 8-397 "resulted in 
such discontinuity that OCAW could not legitimately claim 
to represent the employees without a NLRB election to 
resolve the question concerning representation." Pet'r Br. at 
1. 
 
CPS relies heavily on several cases decided by this Court 
in the 1970s, in which we refused to enforce Board orders 
similar to the one at issue here. See Sun Oil Co. v. NLRB, 
576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler N. 
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E. Co., 540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1976); American Bridge Div., 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972). Our 
reasoning in those cases, however, has been undermined in 
significant respects by an intervening decision of the 
Supreme Court. See NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, 
Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192 (1986) [Sea-First]. Sea-First 
created a new standard by which we must evaluate cases 
such as the present one and prevents us from relying on at 
least some of the factors we considered persuasive in our 
earlier cases. More specifically, Sea-First requires the Board 
(and us) to focus exclusively on employees and their 
relationship to their union when evaluating whether a 
"question of representation" exists. Any concern with the 
effect of internal union changes on the union's relationship 
with the employer, upon which we focused in our earlier 
cases, are outside the purview of representation issues 
under the Act. Further, to the extent that a portion of our 
analysis in the earlier cases is still valid, wefind this case 
easily distinguishable on its facts. 
 
In this case, the Board applied its general principles 
governing union recognition, as well as the specific 
principles for union affiliations that require the employer to 
demonstrate that an affiliation has created a substantial 
change in a union and in the relationship between the 
employees and their union. The Board found there to be no 
substantial change. We find that the Board's factual 
findings and its application of these affiliation principles 
have substantial support in the record, and that its 
conclusions are based on a reasonable interpretation of the 
Act and the case law in this area. Consequently, we will 
deny CPS's petition for review and will enforce the Board's 
order.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. CPS also sought review of the Board's refusal to enforce its subpoena 
for certain union records. CPS did not formally request that the Board 
enforce the subpoena, and virtually all of the records it requested were 
provided before or at the hearing. Further, it has presented no evidence 
of prejudice in the failure of the Board to enforce its subpoena. See 
Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 893 F.2d 1468, 1484-85 (3d Cir.) 
("Absent a showing of abuse of discretion or actual prejudice," a 
challenge to a failure to produce documents prior to an NLRB hearing 
will be rejected), vacated in part on other grounds, 907 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 
1990) (en banc). 
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I. 
 
CPS operates a chemical plant in Old Bridge, New Jersey, 
at which it employs approximately 32 production employees 
(operators, mechanics, and laborers). From 1984 through 
1995, these employees were represented by an independent 
union, which was not affiliated with any local, regional, or 
national organization. The independent union handled its 
own negotiations, electing a committee of workers to 
bargain with the employer, and processed its grievances 
without outside assistance. On the rare occasions when 
grievances were arbitrated, the union hired an attorney to 
handle those cases. In 1995, leaders of the independent 
union began exploring the possibility of affiliating with a 
larger union. At this time, the employer and union were 
parties to a three-year collective bargaining agreement, 
effective through January 3, 1996. In April 1995, about half 
of the CPS employees met with representatives of Local 8- 
397 of OCAW, a national union with approximately 85,000 
members. Following discussions with OCAW, a special 
meeting was called by the independent union's leadership 
for CPS employees to vote on whether or not to affiliate with 
Local 8-397. Notice of the meeting was sent to all union 
members on May 1, 1995, and the meeting was held on 
May 17, 1995. 
 
Fifteen employees attended the May 17 meeting and 
voted by secret ballot. Seven others mailed in absentee 
ballots. All twenty-two members of the independent union 
who voted cast their ballot in favor of affiliation. As a result 
of the vote, a resolution was adopted changing the name of 
the independent union and handing over all assets and 
property of the independent union to Local 8-397. The 
resolution also indicated that Local 8-397 would become a 
party to the collective bargaining agreement with CPS, and 
directed the leadership of the union to take all necessary 
steps to effect the change in affiliation. 
 
CPS employees make up only a small portion of Local 8- 
397's membership; employees of approximately 18 different 
employers are affiliated with the Local, which has about 
550 members. All Local 8-397 members employed by the 
same company make up a "unit group." Each unit group 
handles its own negotiations and grievances, but a 
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representative of OCAW usually assists in negotiations and 
arbitrations. The unit groups decide grievance settlements 
on their own and must approve any collective bargaining 
agreement to which they are a party. The International also 
must approve any contracts negotiated by the unit groups, 
but the International cannot force a unit group to accept a 
contract that the latter does not itself approve. Local 8-397 
dues are equal to two hours pay per month, or about $30 
for CPS employees, as compared to the independent union's 
dues of $12 per month. Unit groups elect a unit vice- 
president, who leads the unit and sits on Local 8-397's 
executive board, and grievance/negotiation committeemen.2 
 
Following the affiliation vote, Local 8-397 wrote to CPS 
informing it of the affiliation. After requesting certain 
information and noting that it would withhold judgment on 
the affiliation, CPS notified Local 8-397 on June 7, 1995, 
that it would not recognize the affiliation and that it would 
refuse to recognize and bargain with Local 8-397 as the 
representative of its production employees. Local 8-397 
therefore filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
NLRB, which issued a complaint against CPS, alleging 
violations of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), (5) (1994). Section 
8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to refuse to bargain with the representative of its 
employees. Section 8(a)(1) makes it improper to "interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed" in section 7 of the Act, including the 
rights to organize and bargain collectively. Following a 
hearing, an Administrative Law Judge found that CPS had 
violated both section 8(a)(1) and (5). The Board affirmed the 
ALJ's findings and adopted his recommended order. See 
CPS Chemical Co., 324 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 1997 WL 703038 
(Nov. 7, 1997). CPS petitioned this Court for review of the 
Board's order and the NLRB cross-petitioned for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The CPS unit group has not held elections because CPS has refused 
to recognize and bargain with the new entity. It expects to do so once 
recognition is forthcoming. The president of the former independent 
union has maintained his leadership position pending elections, 
effectively acting as the new unit's vice president. 
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enforcement of the order. We have jurisdiction under 
section 10(e) and (f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. S 160(e), (f). 
 
While CPS challenges many of the Board's factual 
findings, "we must . . . accept the Board's factual 
determinations and reasonable inferences derived from 
factual determinations if they are supported by substantial 
evidence." Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 
1994). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. 
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) 
(internal quotations omitted). As to the Board's legal 
analysis of the affiliation issue, our review is plenary, but 
"[b]ecause of the Board's `special competence' in the field of 
labor relations, its interpretation of the Act is accorded 
substantial deference." Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 
473 U.S. 95, 100 (1985). 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
This case is governed by certain basic principles 
established by the Act and the cases construing it. It is well 
settled that a duly recognized union enjoys a rebuttable 
presumption that it has the support of a majority of 
bargaining unit employees after its first year of 
representation. See Furniture Rentors of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 
36 F.3d 1240, 1244 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). An employer who 
doubts the validity of this presumption--i.e., an employer 
who believes that a "question of representation" exists-- 
may take one of three steps to clarify the union's continued 
majority support. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 820 (1998). It may (1) petition for a 
Board-supervised election, see 29 U.S.C.S 159(c)(1)(B); 29 
C.F.R. S 101.17 (1998); (2) conduct an internal poll of its 
employees to gauge their support for the union, see Hajoca 
Corp. v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 1169, 1173 (3d Cir. 1989); or (3) 
withdraw recognition and refuse to bargain with the union, 
see Furniture Rentors, 36 F.3d at 1244 n.1. An employer 
who chooses either of the latter two paths must show that 
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it had a "good faith reasonable doubt" as to the union's 
continued majority support at the time it polled its 
employees or withdrew support; otherwise, it commits an 
unfair labor practice. See Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 
820. 
 
In this case, the employer followed the third course, 
unilaterally withdrawing recognition from the union. 
Therefore, it must demonstrate a "good faith reasonable 
doubt" as to the union's majority status to avoid the impact 
of our labor laws.3 Here, CPS attempts to do so by arguing 
that there was sufficient discontinuity between the pre- 
affiliation independent union and the post-affiliation entity 
to deny the latter the benefit of the majority support 
presumption. The Board has developed specific rules for 
evaluating claims that an affiliation excuses an employer's 
withdrawal of recognition from its union. If the principles 
on which the Board relies are sufficiently grounded in the 
Act and are not applied arbitrarily or capriciously, we must 
affirm the resulting decision reached by the Board. See 
Dorsey Trailers, Inc. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 
1998) ("[T]his Court will enforce a board order that rests on 
a construction of the Act that is not an unreasonable or 
unprincipled construction of the statute." (internal 
quotations and brackets omitted)). 
 
The relevant measuring rod in an affiliation case is 
contained in NLRA section 9(c), which provides that the 
Board can certify or decertify a union only after holding a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. CPS asserts that the Board improperly placed on it the burden of 
proof in this case. This argument is without merit. There is no doubt 
that the Board has the burden of proving that an employer refused to 
bargain with its union. In this case, it is conceded that CPS has refused 
to bargain with Local 8-397. The disputed issue is whether this refusal 
was justified by a good faith reasonable doubt as to the union's majority 
status. It is appropriately the employer's burden to prove this defense to 
the established refusal to bargain. See Hajoca , 872 F.2d at 1174-75; see 
also Sioux City Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 154 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 1998) 
("The employer has the burden of proving that the affiliation lacks 
substantial continuity."); cf. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 820 (noting 
that withdrawal of recognition is an unfair labor practice "unless the 
employer can show that it had a `good faith reasonable doubt' about the 
union's majority support"). 
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hearing and determining that "a question of representation 
exists," and then directing that an election be held. 29 
U.S.C. S 159(c). Under section 9(c), any Board rule 
regarding union affiliations and withdrawal of recognition 
must be grounded in the basic "question of representation" 
formula: 
 
        Under the Act, the certified union must be recognized 
       as the exclusive bargaining representative of all 
       employees in the bargaining unit, and the Board 
       cannot discontinue that recognition without 
       determining that the affiliation raises a question of 
       representation and, if so, conducting an election to 
       decide whether the certified union still is the choice of 
       a majority of the unit. 
 
Sea-First, 475 U.S. at 202; see also id. at 203 ("[W]here 
affiliation does not raise a question of representation, the 
statute gives the Board no authority to act."). 
 
Sea-First is the Supreme Court's leading union-affiliation 
case. A unanimous Court held that a question of 
representation arises only if (1) "a new affiliation . . . 
substantially change[s] a certified union's relationship with 
the employees it represents" and (2) this change makes it 
"unclear whether a majority of employees continue to 
support the reorganized union." Id. at 202. Further, the 
Court noted that the evaluation of these issues must be 
undertaken with the policy of the NLRA in mind: industrial 
stability, which "would unnecessarily be disrupted if every 
union organizational adjustment were to result in 
displacement of the employer-bargaining representative 
relationship." Id. at 202-03 (internal quotations omitted). 
While CPS correctly notes that the Court in Sea-First did 
not pass on the Board's underlying affiliation 
jurisprudence, see id. at 200 n.7, the Court's holding that 
the Board's affiliation rule at issue there exceeded its 
authority was based on its reading of section 9(c) as 
focusing exclusively on whether the union continued to 
enjoy majority support from the bargaining unit. As long as 
the Board's affiliation jurisprudence remains grounded in 
this reading of section 9(c), it will be a reasonable 
interpretation of the Act. 
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B. 
 
Both before and after Sea-First, the Board's standard for 
evaluating affiliation cases has been straightforward: an 
employer can rebut the presumption that a post-affiliation 
entity continues to enjoy majority support by proving that 
either (1) the affiliation vote did not meet minimal due 
process standards or (2) the affiliation substantially 
changed the nature of the pre-affiliation union. See, e.g., 
Western Commercial Transp., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 214, 217 
(1988) ("The Board's traditional practice in such cases has 
been to examine whether an affiliation election was 
conducted with appropriate safeguards and whether there 
was a substantial change in the identity of the 
representative entity."). CPS does not argue that the vote 
lacked due process, so we need not address that issue here. 
 
The Board has traditionally used a totality-of- 
circumstances analysis to determine whether there has 
been a substantial change in a union following affiliation. 
See, e.g., Sullivan Bros. Printers, Inc. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 
1217, 1223 (1st Cir. 1996). While the specific factors may 
differ in each case, we will typically defer to the Board's 
choice and evaluation of these factors as long as the focus 
remains on whether "a question of representation" exists 
and the Board's application of the factors is not arbitrary 
and capricious. 
 
III. 
 
CPS relies primarily on the above cited cases from the 
1970s, see supra, in which we denied the Board's petition 
for enforcement. We decline to similarly deny the Board's 
petition here, however, as we hold that these cases are no 
longer entirely valid precedents in light of the Supreme 
Court's intervening decision in Sea-First. An existing panel 
decision may be undermined by a succeeding decision of 
the Supreme Court even if the Court does not directly 
address the issue raised in the prior case. See Sheet Metal 
Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 19 v. United States 
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 135 F.3d 891, 902 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Indeed, a number of courts have opined that our trilogy of 
cases stand on weak ground following Sea-First. See, e.g., 
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May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 897 F.2d 221, 229 n.9 (7th 
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he trilogy of Third Circuit cases . . . are of 
questionable precedential value in light of Sea-First."); 
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 792, 798 (9th 
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he Court's statements cast doubt on the 
continuing validity of the Third Circuit's jurisprudence in 
this area . . . ."). Moreover, to the extent these cases remain 
good law, we find them distinguishable on their facts from 
the present case. 
 
The first of these cases was American Bridge Division, 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972), 
which is wholly distinguishable on its facts.4 It was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In American Bridge, we found that an affiliation created "a far 
different 
organization because the people who conduct a substantial part of the 
unit's dealings with management are no longer the association's officers, 
and the power of the unit's members to control those agents has 
radically changed." Id. at 663. We focused on four factors: (1) the local 
union could no longer call a strike without the approval of an outsider 
(i.e., the international's president); (2) settlement of all grievances 
and 
other disputes would be made by the international union; (3) dues 
payments would go to the international union; and (4) the international 
had the power to determine when a strike would occur and when a 
contract would be signed. See id. at 664. In other words, there was "a 
clear departure from the former status of an independent union, where 
local officers negotiated the contract, settled the terms, handled the 
grievances and decided when and when not to strike"--a departure 
which "may well raise serious discontent among the employees." Id. We 
also expressed concern regarding the closeness of the affiliation vote and 
the lack of a secret ballot. See id. at 666. 
 
American Bridge is easily distinguishable from the present case. Here, 
the CPS employees retain the right to strike without approval from the 
Local or OCAW. While OCAW has the right to withhold strike funds, 
there is no indication that the pre-affiliation union had any strike funds 
available, so "there is no showing that the CPS employees' freedom to 
strike has been impaired in any material way as a result of the 
affiliation." CPS Chemical Co., 324 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 1997 WL 703038, 
at *7 (Nov. 7, 1997). Local CPS employees will serve on the bargaining 
committee for negotiations, although an OCAW representative may assist 
them. No contract can be imposed on the employees without their 
consent. Grievances will be handled by the local officers, while the CPS 
unit will be assisted at arbitrations by an OCAW representative as they 
had been by an outside attorney before the affiliation. Finally, while the 
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primarily in the latter two cases that we relied on factors no 
longer viable after Sea-First. These affiliation cases, like 
American Bridge, are distinguishable from the present one, 
but more importantly, they have been partially (and 
significantly) undermined by Sea-First. In those cases, we 
focused, at least in part, on the effect of the affiliation on 
the employer. The Supreme Court, however, made clear in 
Sea-First that the Board's focus (and ours) must be 
grounded in the language of section 9(c) of the Act, and 
therefore must be exclusively on how the affiliation affects 
the union and its members. 
 
In NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler North East Co., 540 F.2d 197 
(3d Cir. 1976), the international union with which the 
independent entity eventually affiliated challenged the 
status of the independent union (alleging that it was 
dominated by the employer and was not a legitimate union). 
When efforts to have an NLRB complaint issued or to 
hold a certification election failed, the international's 
representative entered affiliation discussions with the union 
it had previously attacked. See id. at 198, 201, 203 n.9. As 
in American Bridge, in Bernard Gloekler the local with 
which the previously independent union affiliated controlled 
access to arbitrations and the international had sole 
discretion whether or not to call a strike. See id. at 199- 
200. 
 
In deciding Bernard Gloekler, we placed considerable 
emphasis on the effect of the affiliation on the employer, 
focusing on the fact that the affiliation created a union with 
greater resources for bargaining and for economic actions 
such as strikes: "[T]he Company would be dealing with a 
union with different economic options and with a different 
locus of power." Id. at 202. We distinguished an earlier 
affiliation case by noting that, in the prior case, "[t]he 
company had no objection to the change in the local's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
present case does share one factor with American Bridge (dues will 
eventually be higher following the affiliation and the dues will go 
directly 
to the Local and the OCAW), "the greater financial commitment asked of 
OCAW members undoubtedly reflects to some extent the fact that a large 
international union can provide more extensive services than a small 
independent like the Association." Id. at *6. 
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affiliation from one international to another. . .. For all 
intents and purposes, the company's position indicated 
there was no question of representation because the 
contractual party was the same." Id. at 203. 
 
In Sun Oil Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978), we 
again emphasized factors that are either not present in this 
case or are not a proper part of the affiliation analysis after 
Sea-First. These included "control by the International over 
the procedure for calling a strike" and concern over the fact 
that "the Company is now required to bargain with an 
International Union . . . which can also flex considerably 
more bargaining muscle than the 30-person local 
Independent." Id. at 557. We then held that "the increase in 
bargaining power," along with the transfer of much control 
to the international, made the case indistinguishable from 
American Bridge and Bernard Gloekler. See id. Finally, we 
outlined our view of the proper affiliation analysis, 
including an examination of whether the affiliation changed 
the employees' "obligations to management." Id. at 558. 
However, following Sea-First, factors that focus on the effect 
of the affiliation on the employer are no longer valid. See, 
e.g., May Dep't Stores, 897 F.2d at 229 n.9 ("[T]he 
increased size, financial support and bargaining power that 
such mergers create are the very factors recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Sea-First as the ordinary, valid reasons 
for mergers."). 
 
In Sea-First, the Court made clear that an affiliation is no 
different from other internal changes made by a union, and 
that it only justifies a change in the bargaining relationship 
if it raises a question of representation. See 475 U.S. at 
205-07. In rejecting the Board's pre-Sea-First rule requiring 
that a union permit nonunion employees to vote on an 
affiliation, the Court noted: 
 
       The Act assumes that stable bargaining relationships 
       are best maintained by allowing an affiliated union to 
       continue representing a bargaining unit unless the 
       Board finds that the affiliation raises a question of 
       representation. . . . The Board's rule effectively gives 
       the employer the power to veto an independent union's 
       decision to affiliate, thereby allowing the employer to 
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       directly interfere with union decisionmaking Congress 
       intended to insulate from outside interference. 
 
Id. at 209; cf. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 
781, 790 (1996) (expressing doubt that employees' 
representational interests could be protected by their 
employer). 
 
The emphasis in Bernard Gloekler and Sun Oil on the 
effect of the affiliation on the employer clearly is not an 
appropriate focus following Sea-First, and we decline to 
consider this factor (and the Board properly declined as 
well) in this or future cases. We also conclude that the 
remaining factors from these earlier cases, such as the lack 
of local control over grievances, bargaining, and strikes, are 
readily distinguishable from those in the present case, in 
which the CPS employees retain authority over day-to-day 
matters such as grievances and negotiations. Finally, we 
note that our analyses in Bernard Gloekler and Sun Oil 
ignored the Board's longstanding presumption, implicitly 
endorsed by the Court in Sea-First, that an affiliation itself 
has no probative value regarding employees' continued 
support for the union. See Sea-First, 475 U.S. at 203 n.10. 
In our earlier cases, the smaller union's act of affiliating 
with a larger organization was itself seen as probative of a 
lack of continuity, justifying the employer's refusal to 
recognize the new entity. After Sea-First, this presumption 
of discontinuity from the fact of affiliation is no longer 
warranted.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Judge Garth notes that Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), specifying a standard of 
deference, was decided by the Supreme Court after this Court's trilogy of 
cases (Sun Oil Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. 
Bernard Gloekler N. E. Co., 540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1976); American Bridge 
Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972)). Chevron 
dictates that a federal court "must defer to a reasonable construction of 
a statute by the administrative agency charged with administering the 
statute if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue." Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 859 (3d Cir. 1996). D.M. 
Sabia, among other things, held that a panel opinion, decided before 
Chevron, did not accord proper Chevron deference to an administrative 
agency (OSHA), and therefore did not bind a subsequent panel. See id. 
at 859-60. Judge Garth believes that the deferential standard of review 
we apply here is consistent with principles in Chevron because Congress 
has not spoken to the pre- and post-affiliation circumstances that would 
raise a question of representation sufficient to relieve an employer of 
its 
statutory bargaining obligations. 
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IV. 
 
Having addressed CPS's reliance on our prior cases for its 
challenge to the Board's order, we now address its 
objections to the Board's specific application of its affiliation 
principles in this case. The factors which the Board found 
dispositive here included the following: (1) the independent 
union's president continues to serve as the unit's leader 
following affiliation; (2) employees are eligible to join the 
new union without paying an initiation fee and without an 
immediate increase in dues (which will rise to OCAW's 
standard dues level over five years); (3) contracts will be 
negotiated by a committee made up of CPS employees; (4) 
the employees cannot have contract terms imposed on 
them against their will; and (5) the employees' freedom to 
strike has not been impaired. See CPS Chemical Co., 324 
N.L.R.B. No. 154, 1997 WL 703038, at *4-*7 (Nov. 7, 1997). 
Moreover, although the independent union's assets were 
transferred to Local 8-397, "there is no showing that the 
CPS employees have fewer resources that can be committed 
to their representational needs" than before the affiliation. 
Id. at *8. 
 
CPS challenges some of the factual findings underlying 
the Board's decision and also argues that there is a lack of 
continuity on the basis of additional factors not listed 
above. Although reasonable minds could differ on certain 
conclusions,6 there is clearly substantial support in the 
record for the Board's findings of fact. In some cases, the 
factual disputes revolve around the differences between the 
stated policy of OCAW and its actual practice, with CPS 
emphasizing the former and the Board focusing on the 
latter. However, the Board has consistently looked at actual 
practice and not at mere policy statements when 
undertaking affiliation analyses, see Sullivan Bros., 99 F.3d 
at 1226, and we find this choice to be a reasonable one. We 
have considered the additional factors cited by CPS, but 
find them either insufficient to offset the substantial 
evidence supporting the Board's finding of continuity or 
simply immaterial to a determination of whether a question 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For example, it is unclear whether OCAW has unequivocally promised 
to phase in the new dues level. 
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of representation exists, and not worthy of discussion. We 
thus find CPS's attack on the Board's affiliation analysis to 
be without merit and have no difficulty enforcing its 
bargaining order on the basis of its rational analysis of the 
relevant factors. 
 
V. 
 
CPS also claims that the Board's decision in this case is 
inconsistent with its own governing precedents, including 
the two leading affiliation cases after Sea-First. In both of 
those cases, a majority of the Board found that substantial 
changes had occurred following affiliation, excusing the 
employer's refusal to recognize the post-affiliation union. 
See Western Commercial Transp., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 214 
(1988); Garlock Equip. Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 247 (1988). Given 
the necessarily fact-bound nature of the Board's totality-of- 
the-circumstances analysis, we find nothing troubling in 
the different results reached by the Board in these earlier 
cases and in the present one. 
 
In both of these earlier cases, the key factors which the 
Board relied upon to find a lack of continuity were that (1) 
daily representation matters and regular contract 
administration were handled by full-time union 
staffpersons following affiliation whereas they were formerly 
handled by an elected employee-officer; (2) strikes could 
only be undertaken with the approval of international 
officers; and (3) in at least one of the cases, there was no 
indication that employees would continue to select any of 
their leaders. See Western Commercial, 288 N.L.R.B. at 216; 
Garlock, 288 N.L.R.B. at 248. As noted above, wefind 
substantial support in the record for the Board'sfinding 
that these factors are not present here. Daily representation 
matters, grievances, and contract negotiations will be 
handled by CPS employees, as they were prior to the 
affiliation. The only difference is that the affiliation has 
provided the employees with the option of seeking 
assistance from OCAW staffpersons when grievances are 
taken to arbitration or when contract negotiations are being 
conducted. The decision to strike can be made by CPS 
employees alone, without the approval of any Local 8-397 
or OCAW officers. Finally, CPS employees will continue to 
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elect their ultimate leader, the unit vice-president, as well 
as committee members who will handle grievances and 
negotiations. 
 
The Board's application of the totality-of-circumstances 
analysis here was fair and rational, and fully consistent 
with its prior affiliation jurisprudence, including the 
decisions in Western Commercial and Garlock. Application 
of the Board's affiliation principles will sometimes lead to a 
determination that substantial changes have taken place, 
warranting an employer's refusal to bargain. In other cases, 
the analysis will rationally lead to a conclusion that 
continuity exists, leaving a recalcitrant employer subject to 
the sanctions of the NLRA for its withdrawal of recognition. 
That the analysis leads to different results, and that the 
Board reached a different conclusion under its analysis in 
the present case than it did in Western Commercial and 
Garlock, is insufficient reason for us to look unfavorably on 
either the Board's affiliation principles or its application of 
these principles. We will not deny enforcement of the 
Board's order simply because it has reached a different 
conclusion here than it did in prior cases with somewhat 
similar--but ultimately distinguishable--facts. 
 
Other courts have similarly found no problem with the 
varying results the Board has reached in applying affiliation 
facts to its principles. The Seventh Circuit granted the 
Board's petition for enforcement of a decision finding that 
continuity existed despite the international's post-affiliation 
right to review all bargaining proposals and final 
agreements of the previously independent union; the 
requirement that the international authorize any local 
strikes; and the fact that the local's dues were subject to 
minimums set by the international. See May Dep't Stores, 
897 F.2d at 229; see also id. at 229-30 & n.10 (discussing 
the relevant affiliation factors and distinguishing Western 
Commercial and Garlock). 
 
The First Circuit recently affirmed a Board finding of 
continuity following affiliation despite the fact that the post- 
affiliation entity had all new officers and the former entity's 
assets were transferred to the union with which it affiliated. 
See Sullivan Bros., 99 F.3d at 1224, 1229. Finally, earlier 
this year, the Eighth Circuit granted a Board petition for 
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enforcement of a decision finding continuity, relying on four 
primary factors: (1) "the employees retained the right to 
elect their own negotiating teams for collective bargaining"; 
(2) employees maintained "the right to decide whether to 
accept contract proposals"; (3) local officials would decide 
whether to take a grievance to arbitration, although 
international officials could assist in the process; and (4) no 
employees could be forced to pay dues or fees to the new 
entity, as the plant was in a "right-to-work" state. Sioux 
City Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 154 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 
1998). All but the last factor are present in this case. 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the Board's 
Petition for Enforcement of its decision and deny CPS's 
petition for review. 
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